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Quantum-cryptography key distribution (QCKD) experiments have been recently reported using
polarization-entangled photons. However, in any practical realization, quantum systems suffer from
either unwanted or induced interactions with the environment and the quantum measurement sys-
tem, showing up as quantum and, ultimately, statistical noise. In this paper, we investigate how
ideal polarization entanglement in spontaneous parametric downconversion (SPDC) suffers quantum
noise in its practical implementation as a secure quantum system, yielding errors in the transmitted
bit sequence. Because all SPDC-based QCKD schemes rely on the measurement of coincidence to
assert the bit transmission between the two parties, we bundle up the overall quantum and statis-
tical noise in an exhaustive model to calculate the accidental coincidences. This model predicts the
quantum-bit error rate and the sifted key and allows comparisons between different security criteria
of the hitherto proposed QCKD protocols, resulting in an objective assessment of performances and
advantages of different systems.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Yz, 03.65.Ud, 42.65.-k
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Cryptography Key Distribution (QCKD) is
at the moment the most advanced and challenging appli-
cation of quantum information. QCKD offers the possi-
bility that two remote parties, sender and receiver (con-
ventionally called Alice and Bob), can exchange a secret
random key, called sifted key (string of qubits), to im-
plement a secure encryption/decryption algorithm based
on a shared secret key, without the need that the two
parties meet [1–3].
In practical QCKD, Alice and Bob use a quantum
channel, along which sequences of signals are either sent
or measured at random between different bases of or-
thogonal quantum states. Alice can play the role of ei-
ther setting randomly the polarization basis of photons
and sending them to Bob (faint laser pulses as photon
source), or measuring photons randomly in any one of
the selected bases (entangled photon source). Bob, ran-
domly and independently from Alice, measures in one
of the bases. The sifted key consists of the subset of
measurements performed when Alice’s and Bob’s bases
are in an agreed configuration according to the proto-
col used, obtaining at this point a deterministic outcome
whose security relies on the laws of quantum physics, for
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they previously agreed upon the correspondence between
counting a photon in a specific state and the bit values
0 or 1. In contrast, the security of conventional cryptog-
raphy relies upon the unproven difficulty in factorizing
large numbers into prime numbers by a conventional al-
gorithm. We note that there is no guarantee that such
an algorithm does not exist.
The underlying feature of QCKD, namely the reliance
of the security of the distributed secret key on the laws
of quantum physics [1–3], gives it an advantage over the
public key cryptography. In other words, the uncer-
tainty principle prohibits one from gaining information
from a quantum channel without disturbing it. Basi-
cally, QCKD is founded on the principle that when a
third party (Eve) performs a measurement on a qubit
exchanged, she induces a perturbation, yielding errors
in the bit sequence transmitted, revealing her presence.
Any attempt by Eve to obtain information about the key
leads to a nonzero error rate in the generated sifted key.
Nevertheless this last claim must be somewhat softened
because of practical realization of quantum channels [4].
Unfortunately, in practical systems, errors also happen
because of experimental leakage, like losses in optics, de-
tection, electronics and noise. Also, even when no eaves-
dropper is disturbing the bit exchange, there will be er-
rors in the transmission and Alice’s and Bob’s strings will
not coincide perfectly. Thus in practice there is no way
to distinguish an eavesdropper attack from experimental
imperfections, making it necessary to establish an upper
bound on tolerable experimental imperfections in the re-
alization of the quantum channels to implement an error
2correction procedure.
Following the first proposal by Bennett and Bras-
sard [1] and later the Ekert protocol invoking entangled
states [2], various systems of QCKD have been imple-
mented and tested by groups around the world. Re-
cently some research groups [5–9] performed the first
QCKD experiments based on polarization-entangled pho-
ton pairs, and Brassard et al. [4] proved theoretically that
QCKD schemes based on spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) offer enhanced performance, mostly
in terms of security, compared to QCKD based on weak
coherent pulses.
Entangled photons, generated by SPDC in nonlinear
crystals, have proved largely successful for quantum op-
tical communication [10–13] and quantum radiometry
[14–23]. Furthermore, basic experimental tests of the
foundation of quantum mechanics had been performed
by exploiting the entanglement of this source [24–26].
However, quantum noise in a SPDC quantum state may
significantly limit performance of the proposed quantum
optical communication and information technologies.
In this paper we provide a general model for an a
priori evaluation of some crucial parameters of a gen-
eral QCKD scheme based on polarization entangled pho-
tons. We basically adopt the formalism of quantum op-
erations [27] to describe the dynamics of an open quan-
tum system subject either to the interactions with the
environment or to a quantum device performing a mea-
surement on it. These unwanted or induced interac-
tions show up as noise in quantum-information process-
ing systems, degrading their ideal performance. Exploit-
ing the quantum-operation formalism we present a model
to quantify precisely both quantum and ultimately sta-
tistical noise in quantum-information experiments per-
formed using an entangled photon source.
In Section II we consider quantum noise in a lossless
measurement system where noise is due to the coupling
between the polarization mode of the source with the po-
larizing beam splitter ports. In Section III we discuss the
case of a lossy system, where noise is induced by detec-
tion deficiencies, such as losses of correlated photons from
the presence of optical elements, non-ideal detectors, and
electronic devices in either channel, and detector dark-
counts.
The model concludes with the calculation of an overall
probability of total coincidence counts, including an im-
perfect time-correlation measurement, ultimately yield-
ing an estimate of accidental coincidences (Section IV).
This result is used in the calculation of the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) for QCKD protocols, i.e., BB84 and
the two variants of the Ekert’s protocol, based on CHSH
and Wigner’s inequalities respectively (Section V). Pre-
visions are also presented about the sifted and the cor-
rected key, the quantum-bit error rate (QBER) before
and after a standard error correction procedure. Finally
we evaluate the performance of security criteria for Ek-
ert’s protocols based on both the CHSH inequality and
Wigner’s inequality (Section VI).
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FIG. 1: QCKD set-up: polarization-entangled photons gen-
erated by SPDC are directed to the two parties (Alice and
Bob). The bit sequence of the key is obtained by means of
polarization-sensitive synchronized measurements performed
by Alice and Bob according to a specific QCKD protocol.
II. QUANTUM NOISE IN POLARIZATION
SELECTION OF PHOTON PAIRS
In this Section we consider a real either non-maximally
entangled or partially mixed state resulting from both
imperfect entangled state generation by SPDC and im-
perfect polarization state selection by real polarizing
beam splitters (PBSs).
In Fig. 1 we depict the typical scheme for quantum
cryptography key distribution as implemented using en-
tangled photons generated by SPDC. Because of a non-
linear interaction in a χ(2) crystal, some pump photons
(angular frequency ωp) spontaneously split into a lower-
frequency pair of photons, historically called signal and
idler, perfectly correlated in all aspects of their state
(direction, energy, polarization, under the constraints of
conservation of energy and wavevector momentum, oth-
erwise known as phase-matching). These entangled states
show perfect correlation for polarization measured along
orthogonal but arbitrary axes.
The QCKD performed by pure entangled states re-
lies on the realization of two quantum correlated optical
channels. These channels yield single-photon polariza-
tion states, such that whenever Alice performs a polariza-
tion measurement on a photon of the pair, automatically
the other photon is projected in a defined polarization
state, i.e., Alice plays the role of triggering Bob’s mea-
surement. In actuality, the light field emerging from the
output of the nonlinear crystal is a polarization-entangled
multimode state. However, it can be described as a po-
larization entangled two-photon state in only two effec-
tive modes (one for channel a and the other for chan-
nel b), as signal and idler pairs can be easily emitted
non-collinearly with the pump by proper phase-matching
rules [28]. This scheme eventually is exploited in quan-
tum information applications by using one channel as the
trigger or reference (a) and the other channel as the probe
3(b). According to Fig. 1, we denote Alice’s detector ap-
paratus to be the trigger and Bob’s to be the probe. Al-
ice and Bob detection apparatus consist of polarization-
analyzer systems (PAS) for proper single-beam polariza-
tion rotation, polarizing beam splitters (PBS), photon
detectors (1a, 2a, 1b, 2b), data storage systems (comput-
ers) and synchronization systems.
Let us consider in the following type II SPDC entan-
gled states [29], where the output two-photon states are
a quantum superposition of orthogonally polarized pho-
tons, i.e. the singlet state [30]:∣∣ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|Ha〉 |Vb〉 − |Va〉 |Hb〉) .
Practically, pure entanglement may not be achieved
because of imperfect source generation and because of
incomplete entangled photon collection. According to
Refs. [31, 32] an uncompensated for coherence loss, in-
duced in the state by the coupling between polarization
and frequency modes because of a birefringent environ-
ment, may produce a partially mixed or non-maximally
entangled state. Also the collection of the same number
of entangled photons on both channels is unlikely, mostly
due to the imperfect positioning of the detection systems
along the true directions of entangled photons on the
SPDC cones. Two complex variables, ζ (|ζ| 6 1) and
ǫ, characterize the imperfect compensation of dephas-
ing and decoherence in the crystal and the misalignment
in collecting entangled photons in the optical paths, re-
spectevely. The net result is a non-maximally entangled,
or partially mixed state, written as
ρ̂ψ =
1
1 + |ǫ|2[
|Ha〉 |Vb〉 〈Vb| 〈Ha|+ |ǫ|2 |Va〉 |Hb〉 〈Hb| 〈Va|+
−ǫζ |Va〉 |Hb〉 〈Vb| 〈Ha| − (ǫζ)∗ |Ha〉 |Vb〉 〈Hb| 〈Va|
]
.
We analyze now the quantum noise introduced via
an imperfect polarization state selection by the PBSs
depicted in Fig. 1. Here, the entangled pho-
tons are detected accordingly to their polarizations
by using imperfect polarizing beam splitters (PBSs)
on both arms and perfect single-photon detectors.
The PBSs project photons onto a polarization basis
{|Ha〉 |Hb〉 , |Va〉 |Vb〉 , |Ha〉 |Vb〉 , |Va〉 |Hb〉} , while the po-
larization analyzer systems (PASs) induce the transfor-
mations represented by the unitary operators T̂z in each
arm (z = a, b), according to
T̂z |Hz〉 = c1 |Hz〉+ c2 |Vz〉 ,
T̂z |Vz〉 = c2 |Hz〉 − c1 |Vz〉 .
In the case of ideal PBSs, channel z transmits state
|Ha〉 (|Hb〉) and reflects state |Va〉 (|Vb〉), i.e., there is a
perfect coupling between the output ports of the PBSs
and the projections of the photon polarization state.
In the approach so far adopted in the literature a per-
fect coupling is always assumed because the measure-
ment process is considered as a projection on polarization
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FIG. 2: Real PBS: all photons projected in
∣∣Va(b)〉 polarized
state should be reflected, but some of these are wrongly trans-
mitted. Moreover all photons projected in
∣∣Ha(b)〉 polarized
state should be transmitted, but some of these are erroneously
reflected.
states |Ha〉 , |Va〉, |Hb〉 , |Vb〉 , thus assuming detectors
1a, 1b, 2a , 2b, are sensitive to polarization. Here we con-
sider a further noise effect induced by the presence of real
PBSs, where a small part of the photons projected onto
|Va〉 (|Vb〉) are erroneously transmitted, and some pho-
tons projected in the state |Ha〉 (|Hb〉) are erroneously
reflected (generally less than 2 % and 5 %, respectively),
as shown in Fig. 2. For this purpose, we extend the
Hilbert space to describe these photon states as
|Hz〉 |O1z〉 = tz |Hz〉 |I1z〉+ rz |Hz〉 |I2z〉
|Hz〉 |O2z〉 = tz |Hz〉 |I2z〉+ rz |Hz〉 |I1z〉
|Vz〉 |O1z〉 = r⊥z |Vz〉 |I2z〉+ t⊥z |Vz〉 |I1z〉
|Vz〉 |O2z〉 = r⊥z |Vz〉 |I1z〉+ t⊥z |Vz〉 |I2z〉 , (1)
where |Oxz〉 represents the photon crossing the output
port of the PBS towards detector xz and |Ixz〉 repre-
sents the photon crossing the input port of the PBS,
with x = 1, 2.
∣∣t⊥z ∣∣2 is the transmittance of photons
in the |Vz〉 polarization state, and
∣∣r⊥z ∣∣2 = 1− ∣∣t⊥z ∣∣2 is
the corresponding reflectance, whose phase relation is
r⊥z /t
⊥
z = i
∣∣r⊥z ∣∣ / ∣∣t⊥z ∣∣. Analogously, |tz|2 and |rz |2 are
the transmittance and reflectance of photons in the |Hz〉
state. So far, we have considered only lossless PBSs. The
effect of photon losses due to all optical devices used in
the channels are treated in Sections III and IV.
We define the input density matrix for the PBS ports
as
ρ̂PBS = |I1a〉 |I1b〉 〈I1b| 〈I1a| ,
and the total input density matrix ρ̂in of the photon sys-
tem as
ρ̂in = ρ̂ψ ⊗ ρ̂PBS.
The formalism of quantum operation is the most suit-
able to describe the evolution of a quantum system cou-
4pled with another quantum system or with the environ-
ment, as well as the evolution of a quantum system sub-
ject to measurement [27]. In this context, we consider the
set of non-trace-preserving quantum operations {Exayb}
defined as
Exayb
(
ρ̂ψ
)
= TrPBS
(
P̂xaybÛψ-PBSŜψρ̂
inŜ†ψÛ
†
ψ-PBSP̂
†
xayb
)
,
describing the process of detection of the photon pair by
the detectors xa and yb (x, y = 1, 2). In this expression,
the unitary operator Ŝψ describes the action of the PASs
and the unitary transformation Ûψ-PBS describes the cou-
pling between the photon pair polarization state and the
PBS ports. The explicit form of Ûψ-PBS is deduced by
Eq.s (1), and calculations are reported in Appendix A.
Because the operators T̂a and T̂b independently act on
the corresponding subspaces a and b of the Hilbert space
of polarization and induce linear transformation, they are
ineffective on the Hilbert space of the PBS ports. Thus,
ρ̂in is subject to a global transformation written as an
unitary operator Ŝψ = 1
PBS⊗Ŝa,b, where Ŝa,b = T̂a⊗T̂b.
P̂xayb = |Oxa〉 |Oyb〉 〈Oyb| 〈Oxa| is the projector rep-
resenting the detection process by the two detectors xa
and yb. The probability of detection of the photon pair
by the detectors xa and yb is
p(xa, yb) = Trψ
[Exayb (ρ̂ψ)] =
= Tr
(
P̂xayb Ûψ-PBSŜψρ̂
inŜ†ψÛ
†
ψ-PBSP̂
†
xayb
)
.(2)
∑
xayb
Exayb
(
ρ̂ψ
)
is trace-preserving because the prob-
abilities of the distinct outcomes sum to one, i.e.,
Trψ
[∑
xayb
Exayb
(
ρ̂ψ
)]
=
∑
xayb
p(xa, yb) = 1 for all
possible input ρ̂ψ.
III. QUANTUM AND CLASSICAL NOISE IN
PHOTON COUNTS
In the following we consider the noise contribution to
the photon counts because of an imperfect collection of
photons and a noisy and lossy detection system. For
the experimental setup in Fig. 1, we calculate the total
probability ptot,xz(n) of n counts by any detector xz by
separately calculating the probabilities of counts associ-
ated with correlated photons (psp,xz (n)), with uncorre-
lated photons (pu,xz(n)), and with detector dark counts
(pd,xz(n)).
To describe the counting process we adopt the formal-
ism of quantum operations, where we consider a general
density matrix representing photons on a channel ν in
term of number of photons, i.e. {|nν〉} , as
ρ̂ν =
∞∑
n,m=0
ρνnm |nν〉 〈mν | . (3)
The evolution of the system ρ̂ν is evaluated according to
the formalism of quantum operations.
In this way, we define the set of non-trace-preserving
quantum operations as {Eµm} as
Eµm (ρ̂ν) = TrEµ
(
P̂µmÛQν-Eµ ρ̂
ν ⊗ |eµ0 〉 〈eµ0 | Û †Qν -EµP̂
µ †
m
)
,
(4)
which describes the detection ofm photons by the system
µ. In this expression the unitary operator ÛQν-Eµ repre-
sents the interaction between the quantum system Qν of
photons in the channel ν in the initial state ρ̂ν and the
lossy and noisy environment Eµ in the initial state |eµ0 〉.
The action of ÛQν-Eµ on the state “number of photons”
is
ÛQν-Eµ |nν〉 |eµ0 〉 =
n∑
m=0
dµ(m,n) |mν〉 ∣∣eµm,n〉 (5)
where |dµ(m,n)|2 is the probability of measuring m pho-
tons out of n present in the channel ν because of losses.
P̂µm =
∑∞
n=m
∣∣eµm,n〉 〈eµm,n∣∣ are the measurement opera-
tors.
Thus, the probability of measuring m counts by the
detection system µ is
pµ(m) = TrQν [Eµm (ρ̂ν)] =
∞∑
n=m
ρνnn |dµ(m,n)|2 (6)
where ρνnn is the probability of having n photons on the
channel ν.
A. Single counts associated with correlated
photons
In the following we concentrate primarily on the mea-
surement of correlated photons by a lossy detector, xz .
We define the density matrix of the number of photon
pairs, ρ̂p, as
ρ̂p =
∞∑
n,m=0
ρpnm |np〉 〈mp| . (7)
Analogous to Eq. (7), we write a density matrix of single
photons of the pairs (sp) along channel z:
ρ̂sp,z =
∞∑
n,m=0
ρpnm |nsp,z〉 〈msp,z| . (8)
The counting of correlated photons on channel z by
the detector xz is described by mapping ρ̂
sp,z on the
set of non-trace-preserving quantum operation {Esp,xzm }.
The explicit form of Esp,xzm (ρ̂sp,z) is deduced by anal-
ogy to Eq. (4), by replacing the interaction unitary
operator with ÛQsp,z-Esp,xz and the measurement oper-
ator with P̂ sp,xzm , given that Qsp,z is the quantum sys-
tem of single photons of the pair on the channel z and
5Esp,xz is the lossy and noisy environment in the ini-
tial state |esp,xz0 〉. The ÛQsp,z-Esp,xz action on the state
|nsp,z〉 is completely described by means of coefficients
dsp,xz (m,n) in complete analogy with Eq. (5), while we
have P̂ sp,xzm =
∑∞
n=m
∣∣esp,xzm,n 〉 〈esp,xzm,n ∣∣.
The probability of m counts by the detector xz corre-
sponding to correlated photons becomes
psp,xz (m) =
∞∑
n=m
ρpnn |dsp,xz(m,n)|2 . (9)
The probability of n pairs is given by ρpnn =
(λpt)
n exp(−λpt)/n!, t being the time of measurement
and λp the mean rate of photon pairs in the Alice and
Bob channels [21, 33–35]. The terms
|dsp,xa(m,n)|2 =
(
n
m
)[
ξxa
∑
yb
p(xa, yb)
]m
[
1− ξxa
∑
yb
p(xa, yb)
]n−m
,
|dsp,yb(m,n)|2 =
(
n
m
)[
ξyb
∑
xa
p(xa, yb)
]m
[
1− ξyb
∑
xa
p(xa, yb)
]n−m
.
are the probabilities that only m out of n photons in
the channel a (b) are counted by the detector xa (yb).
Losses due to electronics (πz), detection efficiencies (ηxz ),
as well as optical losses (τxz) are summed up in the term
ξxz = πzηxzτxz [22, 36]; while we refer to the Appendix B
for the analysis of dead time in this context. The term τxz
incorporates all losses in the Alice and Bob optical path,
such as from crystals, filters, lenses, PBSs, PASs and
fibers. The terms
∑
xa(yb)
p(xa, yb) are the probability
that each photon of the pair may be counted randomly
by any arbitrary detector (Eq. 2). Probability psp,xz(m)
is derived according to Eq. (9), giving
psp,xz(n) = (λsp,xz t)
n exp (−λsp,xz t)
n!
, (10)
with mean count rates given by
λsp,xa = ξxa
∑
yb
p(xa, yb)λp,
λsp,yb = ξyb
∑
xa
p(xa, yb)λp.
B. Single counts associated with uncorrelated
photons and dark counts
Here we consider counts from any detector xz from
stray light, uncorrelated photons, and dark counts even-
tually contributing to noise in the distributed key. The
density matrix associated with stray light and uncorre-
lated photons is
ρ̂u,xz =
∞∑
n,m=0
ρu,xznm |nu,xz〉 〈mu,xz | .
By pursuing the same formalism as before the detection
of uncorrelated photons by the detector xz is described
by means of the set of non-trace-preserving quantum op-
eration {Eu,xzm } . The map Eu,xzm (ρ̂u,xz) follows in anal-
ogy with Eq. (4). The unitary operator ÛQu,xz -Eu,xz
describes the interaction between the quantum system,
Qu,xz , of uncorrelated photons on the channel xz and the
lossy environment, Eu,xz , in the initial state |eu,xz0 〉. The
measurement operator is P̂u,xzm =
∑∞
n=m
∣∣eu,xzm,n 〉 〈eu,xzm,n ∣∣ .
The action of ÛQu,xz -Eu,xz on the state |nu,xz〉 fol-
lows from Eq. (5) with the decomposition coefficients,
du,xz(m,n).
Thus, the probability of measuring m counts of uncor-
related photons by the detector xz is
pu,xz(m) =
∞∑
n=m
ρu,xznn |du,xz (m,n)|2 , (11)
where ρu,xznn is the probability of n uncorrelated photons
in the channel xz . According to Refs. [21, 33–35], we
assume that we have ρu,xznn = (λu,xz t)
n
exp (−λu,xz t) /n!,
where λu,xz is the mean rate of uncorrelated photons.
The term
|du,xz (m,n)|2 =
(
n
m
)
(ξxz)
m
(1− ξxz)n−m
is the probability of m out of n uncorrelated photons
counted by the detector xz .
The pu,xz(n) derived accordingly from Eq. (11) is
pu,xz(n) = (ξxzλu,xz t)
n exp (−ξxzλu,xz t)
n!
. (12)
The main source of noise in detectors is due to dark
counts, whose distribution is regarded merely from a sta-
tistical point of view as the probability of n dark counts
pd,xz(n) = (λd,xz t)
n exp(−λd,xzt)
n!
,
with the mean dark-count rate being λd,xz .
C. Total counts
As real counters cannot distinguish among counts due
to correlated photons, counts due to uncorrelated pho-
tons, and dark counts, the total probability of measur-
ing k counts by detector xz is calculated according to
[21, 33, 35],
ptot,xz(k) =
∞∑
l,m,n=0
δk,l+m+n psp,xz(l) pu,xz(m) pd,xz(n),
6giving
ptot,xz(n) = (λtot,xz t)
n exp(−λtot,xz t)
n!
,
where the mean rate of total counts measured by the
detector xz is λtot,xz = λsp,xz + ξxzλu,xz + λd,xz .
IV. COINCIDENCE COUNTS
We build up a model for the probability pc,xayb(n) of
measuring n coincidences by a pair of detectors xa and yb
in order to estimate crucial quantities of a typical QCKD
experiment, such as the sifted key and the QBER before
and after the error correction procedure, whenever dif-
ferent protocols are applied. We distinguish between the
probability distribution of true coincidences (pp,xayb(n),
due to correlated photons) and the probability distribu-
tion of accidental coincidences (pAcc,xayb(n), because of
imperfections in the detection electronics).
We consider the density matrix in terms of counted
pair states (Eq. (7)), and we describe its evolution
exploiting the formalism of quantum operations as de-
scribed in Section IV by defining another set of non-trace-
preserving quantum operations {Ep,xaybm } .
Ep,xaybm (ρ̂p) describes the measurement of m coinci-
dences originated by the detection of the two photons
of a pair by the detectors xa, yb. Its explicit expression
is found from Eq. (4), except for the interaction be-
tween the quantum system Qp of photon pairs in the
initial state ρ̂p and the lossy and noisy environment
Ep,xayb in the initial state |ep,xayb0 〉 represented by the
unitary operator ÛQp-Ep,xayb and the measurement oper-
ator P̂ p,xaybm =
∑∞
n=m
∣∣ep,xaybm,n 〉 〈ep,xaybm,n ∣∣ .
The action of ÛQp-Ep,xayb on the state “number of pho-
ton pairs” is
ÛQp-Ep,xayb |np〉 |e
p,xayb
0 〉 =
n∑
m=0
dp,xayb(m,n) |mp〉 ∣∣ep,xaybm,n 〉 .
Thus, the probability of measuringm true coincidences
corresponding to photon pairs by the pair of detectors xa,
yb is
pp,xayb(m) =
∞∑
n=m
ρpnn |dp,xayb(m,n)|2 . (13)
Realizing that a true coincidence may occur only if
both photons of the pair are not lost, we emphasize that
the terms |dp,xayb(m,n)|2 are the probabilities that only
m pairs are detected as coincidences by the pair of de-
tectors xa, yb when n photons are present in the Alice’s
and Bob’s channels. It is straightforward to deduce the
explicit form of |dp,xayb(m,n)|2 as
|dp,xayb(m,n)|2 =
(
n
m
)
[ξxaξybp(xa, yb)]
m
[1− ξxaξybp(xa, yb)]n−m .
Probability pp,xayb(n) is derived according to Eq. (13),
obtaining
pp,xayb(n) = (λp,xaybt)
n exp (−λp,xaybt)
n!
where λp,xayb = ξxaξybp(xa, yb)λp is the mean rate of true
coincidences seen by the pair of detectors xa and yb.
A. Accidental coincidences
The presence of the temporal coincidence windoww,
during which coincidences are measured, modifies the
mean total coincidence counts, thus forcing one to distin-
guish between true and accidental coincidence statistics.
We assume that true coincidences occur in the middle of
the coincidence temporal window. Then we deduce the
probability distribution of accidental coincidences and fi-
nally the probability distribution of total coincidences,
accounting for true and accidental coincidences, assum-
ing w < Dz, where Dz is the dead time in the z channel
according to Appendix B.
We regard pN,xz(n) as the probability distribution of
photons counted by the detector xz that may contribute
to accidental coincidences in the time interval ∆t. By ob-
serving that the probability distributions ptot,xz(n) and
pp,xayb(n) are Poisson, it is simple to demonstrate that
we have
pN,xz(n) = (λN,xz∆t)
n exp (−λN,xz∆t)
n!
,
where λN,xa = λtot,xa − λp,xayb , and λN,yb = λtot,yb −
λp,xayb are the mean count rates possibly contributing
to accidental coincidences from the detectors xa and yb,
respectively.
Let us denote by qyb the probability that at least one
photon in yb is counted in the coincidence window ∆t =
w
qyb =
∞∑
n=1
p∆t=wN,xz (n) = 1− exp (−λN,xzw) , (14)
because detectors xa are here considered as triggers.
The term in Eq. (14) is intended to account for the
contribution of single detectors yb. Because detectors yb
are statistically independent, the probability that both
detectors count a photon producing an accidental coinci-
dence is q1b q2b . The final probability of accidental counts
from detector yb is obtained by subtracting half the prob-
ability that both detectors in Bob’s channel count an ac-
cidental photon, in formula
q∗1b = q1b(1 −
1
2
q2b), (15)
q∗2b = q2b(1 −
1
2
q1b). (16)
7According to [21, 33–35], we calculate the probability
distribution of accidental coincidences in the time mea-
surement t by applying the discrete convolution between
the Poisson distribution of “triggering” counts and the
binomial distribution with parameter q∗yb ,
pAcc,xayb(m) =
∞∑
n=m
pN,xa(n)Byb (m,n)
with Byb (m,n) =
(
n
m
)(
q∗yb
)m (
1− q∗yb
)n−m
, giving
pAcc,xayb(n) = (λAcc,xaybt)
n exp (−λAcc,xaybt)
n!
with λAcc,xayb = q
∗
yb
λN,xa .
Lastly the probability distribution of total coincidence
counts pc,xayb(n) is obtained by
pc,xayb(k) =
∞∑
m,n=0
δk,m+n pp,xayb(m) pAcc,xayb(n) =
= (λc,xaybt)
n exp(−λc,xaybt)
n!
,
where the mean rate of total coincidence measured by an
arbitrary pair of xa and yb detectors is
λc,xayb = λp,xayb + λAcc,xayb . (17)
To characterize a particular QCKD procedure we em-
body the effect of the transformations T̂a and T̂b on pho-
ton polarization by the rotation matrices
T̂z =
(
cos θz sin θz
sin θz − cos θz
)
. (18)
We rewrite Eq. (17) in terms of the rotation angles
θa, θb, induced by transformations T̂a and T̂b on the po-
larization state of photons, by replacing p(xa, yb) with
pθa,θb(xa, yb), whose complete expression is in Appendix
A. More specifically, the calculated mean coincident
counts are made explicit in terms of angular settings θa
and θb as λc,xayb(θa, θb)t.
V. EVALUATION OF QBER
To characterize a particular QCKD procedure and to
assess its advantages, we evaluate particular quantities
such as the QBER and the sifted key for different types
of QCKD protocols so far experimentally implemented,
i.e. BB84 protocol and Ekert’s protocols based on CHSH
and Wigner’s inequalities, respectively.
The QBER is a parameter for describing the signal
quality in the transmission of the sifted key, defined as
the relative frequency of errors induced by accidental co-
incidences, i.e. the number of errors divided by the total
size of the cryptographic sifted key (K) [35].
In other words, the QBER is given by total coinci-
dence provided by those detectors “wrongly” firing in
coincidence according to the chosen protocol. In fact the
protocol establishes which pair of detectors should fire to
contribute to the key.
A. BB84 protocol
Here we examine the BB84 protocol variant proposed
for entangled states in ref. [3]. Recall that Alice and
Bob measure photons randomly and independently be-
tween two bases of orthogonal quantum states. One basis
corresponds to horizontal and vertical linear polarization
(⊕), while the other to linear polarizations rotated by 45◦
(⊗). Only half of the photon pairs can contribute to the
sifted key, as only the subset of measurements performed
with the two analyzers in the same basis contributes.
The sifted key is given by
KBB84(θa) = fbasisfsetting (19)∑
xayb
[
λc,xayb(θa, θa)+
λc,xayb(θa + π/4, θa + π/4)
]
t,
where fbasis = 1/2 is the probability to measure in
the right basis ((θa, θa) and (θa + π/4, θa + π/4)), while
fsetting = 1/2 is the probability to measure in a particu-
lar analyzer setting ((θa, θa) or (θa + π/4, θa + π/4)).
All detectors contribute to the sifted key K, but only
coincidences between 1a2b and 2a1b correspond to the ex-
pected anticorrelation when measurements are performed
in the same basis (θa = θb), while QBER contributions
come from the coincidences between detectors 1a1b and
2a2b (as it is clear from Eq.s (A1) in Appendix A). There-
fore the QBERBB84 explicit formula is
QBERBB84(θa)=
∑
x=1,2
[
λc,xaxb(θa, θa)+
λc,xaxb(θa + π/4, θa + π/4)
]
t
4KBB84(θa)
.
(20)
To test the behavior of QBER, we simulate a realistic
experiment with parameters ηxa = ηyb = 0.5 (quantum
efficiency of the four detectors), τxa = τyb = 0.1 (trans-
mittance of the four channels), λd,xa = λd,yb = 50 s
−1
(dark count rate of the four detectors), Da = Db = 100
ns (total dead time of the Alice’s and Bob’s detection sys-
tems), θa = 0 and w = 4 ns. The entanglement param-
eters are ǫ = 0.95 and ζ = 1, the correlation level in the
Alice channel is αa = 0.25 (αa = λp/(λp +
∑
xa
λu,xa)),
and the correlated photon rate is λp = 700KHz.
In Fig. 3 we show the dependence of QBER versus
the optical properties of real PBS, i.e. the transmittance
|tz| and
∣∣t⊥z ∣∣ (z = a, b) for the states |Hz〉 and |Vz〉 re-
spectively. Results show how strongly the QBER can be
affected by the optical properties of PBSs, whose influ-
ence has been neglected so far.
In Fig. 4 the behavior of the QBER is presented ver-
sus the level of correlation, αa, in the Alice channel and
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FIG. 4: QBER for the BB84 protocol versus the correlation
level in the Alice channel αa = λp/(λp +
∑
xa
λu,xa) and the
correlated photon rate λp for two noise levels in the channels
(λb/λa = 1.2 and 3, where λa = λp +
∑
xa
λu,xa and λb =
λp +
∑
yb
λu,yb).
the rate, λp, of the correlated photon pairs for two differ-
ent noise levels, i.e., the ratio between the mean rate of
photons in the two channels. Far from ideal conditions,
the presence of uncorrelated events in the two channels
induces a non-linear increase of the QBER. The other
parameters are set as in Fig. 3 for realistic PBSs param-
eters, |tz|2 = 0.99 and
∣∣t⊥z ∣∣2 = 0.025.
B. Ekert’s protocol
Ekert’s protocol has the peculiarity of relying on the
completeness of quantum mechanics for security. There-
fore, the possible combined choices between Alice and
Bob for analyzer settings split into three groups: the first
for key distribution, the second containing the security
proof, and the third garnering the discarded measure-
ments.
Here we consider two possible variants of Ekert’s pro-
tocol: the variant based on the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt inequality (CHSH), similar to the one proposed in
Ref. [8], and the variant based on Wigner’s inequality
[7].
1. Ekert’s protocol based on CHSH inequalities
To increase the number of measurements devoted to
the key distribution we consider the case where Alice
and Bob measure randomly among four analyzer settings
and use the CHSH inequality to test eavesdropping. In
this scheme, Alice’s choices for the analyzer settings are
θa = (θa, θa + π/8, θa + π/4, θa + 3π/8) and Bob’s are
θb = (θa + π/8, θa + π/4, θa + 3 π/8, θa + π/2).
The key distribution is performed when Alice and
Bob’s settings are the same or orthogonal, so that the
sifted key is
KCHSH(θa) = fsetting
∑
xayb
 λc,xayb(θa, θa + π/2)+λc,xayb(θa + π/8, θa + π/8)+λc,xayb(θa + π/4, θa + π/4)+
λc,xayb(θa + 3π/8, θa + 3π/8)
 t,
where ((θa, θa+π/2), (θa+π/8, θa+π/8), (θa+π/4, θa+
π/4), (θa + 3π/8, θa + 3π/8)) are angular settings gener-
ating the key and fsetting = 1/16.
In a maximally entangled state configuration, the de-
tectors contributing to the key should be 1a1b and 2a2b
for the orthogonal analyzer settings and 1a2b and 2a1b
for the parallel settings. Thus the QBER is calculated
according to
QBERCHSH(θa)=
1
4KCHSH(θa)
 ∑
xa,yb(x 6=y)
λc,xayb(θa, θa + π/2)t+
∑
xa,yb(x=y)
 λc,xayb(θa + π/8, θa + π/8)+λc,xayb(θa + π/4, θa + π/4)+
λc,xayb(θa + 3π/8, θa + 3π/8)
 t
 ,
where the intuitive notation
∑
xa,yb(x 6=y)
indicates the
sum over 1a2b and 2a1b detectors and
∑
xa,yb(x=y)
indi-
cates the sum over 1a1b and 2a2b.
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FIG. 5: QBER in the case of CHSH and Wigner’s inequal-
ity based Ekert’s protocols together with BB84 protocol ver-
sus the angular analyzers settings θa and the entanglement
parameter ǫ. The parameters settings are λa = 2.8 10
6
s−1, αa = 0.25, λb/λa = 1.2, ηxa = ηyb = 0.5, τxa = τyb = 0.1,
λd,xa = λd,yb = 50 s
−1, Da = Db = 100 ns, w = 4 ns and
ζ = 1, taken from typical and experimental realistic values so
far implemented. PBSs are considered real with |tz|
2 = 0.99
and
∣∣t⊥z ∣∣2 = 0.025 (z = a, b).
2. Ekert’s protocol based on Wigner’s inequality
As in Ref. [7], we consider the case of the Ekert’s
variant where the security of the quantum channels fol-
lows from Wigner’s inequality. In this case, Alice and
Bob measure randomly among four analyzers settings
whose choices are θa = (θa − π/6, θa) for Alice and
θb = (θa, θa + π/6) for Bob. The key distribution is
performed when Alice’s and Bob’s settings are the same
so that the sifted key is
KWI(θa) = fsetting
∑
xayb
λc,xayb(θa, θa)t,
with fsetting = 1/4.
The QBER is calculated according to
QBERWI(θa)=fsetting
[λc,1a1b(θa, θa) + λc,2a2b(θa, θa)] t
KWI(θa)
,
by taking the detectors contributing to the wrong bits as
1a1b and 2a2b.
In Fig. 5 we present a comparison of QBER levels for
the BB84 protocol and the Ekert protocols considering
both CHSH and Wigner’s inequality versus the analyz-
ers angular setting θa and the entanglement parameter
ǫ. Experimental conditions are the same (low noise) as
for Figs. 3 and 4. Results highlight that the QBER is
sensitive to the angle θa when the ideal entanglement is
not achieved for both variants of Ekert’s protocols. In
the Wigner’s case, the sensitivity is so remarkable that
this protocol has to be considered less robust than BB84
and the CHSH based Ekert’s protocol.
VI. SECURITY AND ERROR CORRECTION
The security of the BB84 variant protocol is based on
a public comparison between Alice and Bob’s measure-
ments on a sufficiently large random subset of the sifted
key, e.g. more than half is recommended in [3].
The security proof for the CHSH-inequality-based Ek-
ert’s protocol is evaluated with the specific choices of
settings by the CHSH inequality,
S(θa) = E(θa, θa + π/8)− E(θa, θa + 3π/8) +
E(θa + π/4, θa + π/8) + E(θa + π/4, θa + 3π/8),
S′(θa) = E(θa + π/8, θa + π/4)− E(θa + π/8, θa + π/2) +
E(θa + 3π/8, θa + π/4) + E(θa + 3π/8, θa + π/2),
where we have
E(θa, θb) = M1a1b(θa, θb)−M1a2b(θa, θb) +
M2a2b(θa, θb)−M2a1b(θa, θb).
Here
Mxayb(θa, θb) =
λc,xayb(θa, θb)∑
xayb
λc,xayb(θa, θb)
is the normalized coincidence rate as a function of
the analyzer settings and detector choices. The terms
Mxayb(θa, θb) are commonly stored when experiments are
performed.
For maximally entangled states we have |Sql| =
∣∣∣S′ql∣∣∣ =
2
√
2, while for any realistic local theory we have |S, S′| ≤
2. It is expected that the presence of an eavesdropper will
reduce the observed value of |S, S′| , giving |Seve, S′eve| ≤√
2, when the eavesdropper measures photons over either
one or both (total eavesdropping) of Alice’s and Bob’s
channels [2].
In the case of Wigner’s-inequality-based Ekert’s proto-
col, the Wigner’s inequality result has
W (θa) = M1a1b(θa − π/6, θa) +M1a1b(θa, θa + π/6) +
−M1a1b(θa − π/6, θa + π/6),
giving for the maximally entangled states, Wql = −1/8
and W ≥ 0 for any local realistic theory. As for the
CHSH inequality, it can be proved that the limit becomes
Weve ≥ 1/16 for Eve detecting only one photon of the
pair, while in the case of total eavesdropping there is no
boundary condition [37] .
In Fig. 6 we compare the behaviors of
the CHSH and Wigner’s inequality parame-
ters, Snorm =(|S| − |Seve|) / (|Sql| − |Seve|) and
Wnorm = (W −Weve) / (Wql −Weve) , versus the
coincidence window w and the correlation level in Alice’s
channel, αa. The lower surfaces represent the case of
real PBSs, where Wnorm < Snorm, while the upper
surface corresponds to ideal PBSs, where Wnorm =
Snorm. We observe that, given the same noise level in
10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Da
10
20
30
40
50
wsns
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
B
Wnorm
Ideal PBSs: Wnorm=Snorm
Real PBSs
Snorm w  (ns)
  
FIG. 6: The CHSH and Wigner’s inequalities parameters
Snorm and Wnorm versus the coincidence window w and the
correlation level in the Alice channel αa. In the case of max-
imally entangled states we have Wnorm =Snorm =1, while the
lower cut is defined by the eavesdropping limit Wnorm ≤ 0
and Snorm ≤ 0 . The choice of parameter values are the same
of Fig. 4 except for θa = 0 and ǫ = 0.95. The lower two sur-
faces represented correspond to Wnorm and Snorm in the case
of real PBSs, with parameters |tz|
2 = 0.98 and
∣∣t⊥z ∣∣2 = 0.05.
The higher surface represents Snorm=Wnorm in the case of
ideal PBSs.
the system and real PBSs, Wigner’s parameter reaches
the eavesdropping limit faster than the CHSH one does,
revealing the intrinsic weakness of Wigner’s test against
experimental parameters.
Furthermore, the Wigner’s security test guarantees
against eavesdropping strategies only for the detection
of one photon of the pair, while the CHSH security is
independent on the adopted strategy (see refs. [2, 37]).
A satisfactory protocol must be able to recover from
noise as well as from partial leakage, allowing Alice and
Bob to reconcile the two strings of bits measured and dis-
till from the sifted key a corrected key. A strong need for
the application of any error-correctionmethod is an a pri-
ori knowledge of the QBER, which provides information
regarding how many times the error-correction procedure
must be applied to reduce the QBER to a certain agreed
level, commonly 1 %. Here, we show an example of error
correction on an a priori evaluated QBER according to a
common approach reported in Ref. [7], to show that our
model allows for prediction of the corrected key length.
In general, Alice and Bob cannot distinguish between
errors caused either by an eavesdropper or by the en-
vironment. Thus, they must assume that all errors are
due to an eavesdropper and evaluate the leaked informa-
tion from the QBER. Also, even though by the error-
correction procedure one can disregard incorrect bits by
simply dropping them off in building the distilled key, the
residual knowledge of an eavesdropper may still not be
faithfully quantified by the reduced QBER obtained af-
ter the correction. The effects of Eve’s strategy is in fact
equivalent to quantum noise yielding eventually acciden-
tal coincidences, these last contributing to both incorrect
0.20.2250.250.275
0.3 Ja
2.5 5 7.5
10
wsns
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
%
QBER
1/2 QABR after error correctionQBER after error correction
αa w  (ns)
(%)
FIG. 7: QBER in the case of BB84 protocol versus the coin-
cidence window w and the correlation parameter in the Alice
channel αa: the sawtooth shape is due to the application of
the error correction procedure. The parameters are set as in
Figure 6 except that, in this case, ideal PBSs are considered.
and correct bits transmitted, as it is clear from Eqs. (19,
20). Hence the error-correction procedure is not suffi-
cient to cancel a potential Eve’s knowledge of part of the
key due to accidental coincidence.
To prove this last assertion we introduce the quantum
accidental bit rate (QABR), a quantity related to acci-
dental coincidences and, in this sense, analogous to the
QBER. However, the error-correction procedure cannot
reduce the QABR at the QBER level. As an example,
we give the QABR in the case of Ekert’s protocol based
on Wigner’s inequality,
QABRWI(θa)=fsetting
∑
xayb
λAcc,xayb(θa, θa)t
KWI(θa)
.
Figure 7 shows the QBER with and without the ap-
plication of the error-correction procedure together with
the 1/2 QABR vs the coincidence window and the corre-
lation parameter in Alice’s channel. The error-correction
procedure is very ineffective at reducing the QABR and
consequently the possible effect of Eve’s knowledge on
the corrected key.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper is concerned with an a priori evaluation of
QCKD crucial parameters when entangled photons pro-
duced by SPDC are exploited. The basic experimental
feature consists in the detection of coincident photons.
Toward this aim, we developed a statistical model to
calculate the probability of accidental coincidences con-
tributing to errors in the sifted key, not completely ac-
counted for by simple experimental means.
We investigated the noise contribution due to imper-
fect source generation and selection, imperfect polariz-
ing beam splitters performing polarization states analy-
sis, and noisy and lossy measurement system for photon-
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number detection. We emphasized some basic system im-
perfections such as uncorrelated photons collection, de-
tection system deficiencies, detection system noise due
to detector dark counts, and electronic system imperfec-
tions associated with non-ideal-time-correlationmeasure-
ments.
We discussed how this model can be adopted for the
evaluation of the QBER and the sifted key for different
well-known protocols, i.e., BB84 and Ekert’s protocols
based on both CHSH and Wigner’s inequality, and com-
pared them to expected results.
Given that this model predicts precisely the QBER and
the sifted key, it ultimately guarantees a method to com-
pare different security criteria of the hitherto proposed
QCKD protocols and provides an objective assessment of
performances and advantages of different systems. Thus,
it yields a method for an a priori evaluation of the tol-
erable experimental imperfections in a practically imple-
mented quantum system to establish the degree of secu-
rity and competitiveness of QCKD systems.
Finally, we used the model in a standard error-
correction procedure, observing that this does not com-
pletely cancel the possible residual eavesdropping knowl-
edge on the corrected key. We emphasize that this model
yields also the degree of security of the corrected key, if
a precise modelling of system imperfections is provided.
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APPENDIX A: INTERACTION MATRIX Ûψ-PBS
We explicitly calculate the unitary transformation
Ûψ-PBS according to Eq.s (1) obtaining a 16×16 matrix
Ûψ-PBS =
 U1 U2 U3 U4U2 U1 U4 U3U3 U4 U1 U2
U4 U3 U2 U1
 ,
where we indicate
U1 =

TaTb 0 0 0
0 TaT ⊥b 0 0
0 0 T ⊥a Tb 0
0 0 0 T ⊥a T ⊥b
 ; U2 =

TaRb 0 0 0
0 TaR⊥b 0 0
0 0 T ⊥a Rb 0
0 0 0 T ⊥a R⊥b

U3 =

RaTb 0 0 0
0 RaT ⊥b 0 0
0 0 R⊥a Tb 0
0 0 0 R⊥a T ⊥b
 ; U4 =

RaRb 0 0 0
0 RaR⊥b 0 0
0 0 R⊥aRb 0
0 0 0 R⊥aR⊥b

and Tz = tz/(t2z − r2z), Rz = rz/(t2z − r2z) (z = a, b),
analogously for T ⊥z and R⊥z .
According to Eq.s (2) and (18) we obtain for
pθa,θb(xa, yb) the following:
pθa,θb(1a, 1b) =
1
1 + |ǫ|2

cos2(θb)
[
cos2(θa)
(∣∣TaT ⊥b ∣∣2 + ∣∣T ⊥a Tbǫ∣∣2)+ sin2(θa)(∣∣T ⊥a T ⊥b ∣∣2 + |TaTbǫ|2) ]+
sin2(θb)
[
cos2(θa)
(
|TaTb|2 +
∣∣T ⊥a T ⊥b ǫ∣∣2)+ sin2(θa)(∣∣T ⊥a Tb∣∣2 + ∣∣TaT ⊥b ǫ∣∣2) ]+
sin(2θa) cos(2θb)Re(ǫζ/2)
(
− |TaTb|2 +
∣∣T ⊥a Tb∣∣2 + ∣∣TaT ⊥b ∣∣2 − ∣∣T ⊥a T ⊥b ∣∣2 )
 ,
pθa,θb(1a, 2b) =
1
1 + |ǫ|2

cos2(θb)
[
cos2(θa)
(∣∣TaR⊥b ∣∣2 + ∣∣T ⊥a Rbǫ∣∣2)+ sin2(θa)(∣∣T ⊥a R⊥b ∣∣2 + |TaRbǫ|2) ]+
sin2(θb)
[
cos2(θa)
(
|TaRb|2 +
∣∣T ⊥a R⊥b ǫ∣∣2)+ sin2(θa)(∣∣T ⊥a Rb∣∣2 + ∣∣TaR⊥b ǫ∣∣2) ]+
sin(2θa) cos(2θb)Re(ǫζ/2)
(
− |TaRb|2 +
∣∣T ⊥a Rb∣∣2 + ∣∣TaR⊥b ∣∣2 − ∣∣T ⊥a R⊥b ∣∣2 )
 ,
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pθa,θb(2a, 1b) =
1
1 + |ǫ|2

cos2(θb)
[
cos2(θa)
(∣∣RaT ⊥b ∣∣2 + ∣∣R⊥a Tbǫ∣∣2)+ sin2(θa)(∣∣R⊥a T ⊥b ∣∣2 + |RaTbǫ|2) ]+
sin2(θb)
[
cos2(θa)
(
|RaTb|2 +
∣∣R⊥a T ⊥b ǫ∣∣2)+ sin2(θa)(∣∣R⊥a Tb∣∣2 + ∣∣RaT ⊥b ǫ∣∣2) ]+
sin(2θa) cos(2θb)Re(ǫζ/2)
(
− |RaTb|2 +
∣∣R⊥a Tb∣∣2 + ∣∣RaT ⊥b ∣∣2 − ∣∣R⊥a T ⊥b ∣∣2 )
 ,
pθa,θb(2a, 2b) =
1
1 + |ǫ|2

cos2(θb)
[
cos2(θa)
(∣∣RaR⊥b ∣∣2 + ∣∣R⊥aRbǫ∣∣2)+ sin2(θa)(∣∣R⊥aR⊥b ∣∣2 + |RaRbǫ|2) ]+
sin2(θb)
[
cos2(θa)
(
|RaRb|2 +
∣∣R⊥aR⊥b ǫ∣∣2)+ sin2(θa)(∣∣R⊥aRb∣∣2 + ∣∣RaR⊥b ǫ∣∣2) ]+
sin(2θa) cos(2θb)Re(ǫζ/2)
(
− |RaRb|2 +
∣∣R⊥aRb∣∣2 + ∣∣RaR⊥b ∣∣2 − ∣∣R⊥aR⊥b ∣∣2 )
 .
In the case of maximally entangled states, i.e. ǫ =
1 and ζ = 1, and ideal PBSs, i.e., |Rz | =
∣∣T ⊥z ∣∣ = 0 and
∣∣R⊥z ∣∣ = |Tz | = 1, the Ûψ-PBS is simply given by
U1 =
 1 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ; U2 =
 0 0 0 00 i 0 00 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ; U3 =
 0 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 i 0
0 0 0 0
 ; U4 =
 0 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

and
pθa,θb(1a, 1b) = pθa,θb(2a, 2b) = sin
2(θa − θb)/2(A1)
pθa,θb(1a, 2b) = pθa,θb(2a, 1b) = cos
2(θa − θb)/2.
APPENDIX B: DEAD-TIME CORRECTION
DETERMINATION
According to Refs. [36, 38], in the case of
non-extending dead time, the correction is πz =
1/(1 + nzDz/t), where nz are the mean number
of photons counted in the z channel, i.e. nz =∑
xz=1z,2z
∑
k k ptot,xz(k) with ptot,xz(k) calculated in
the absence of dead time Dz, and ξxz = ηxzτxz . We
can therefore write down the dead time correction in this
case as
πa =
{
1 +
∑
xa
[ ∑
yb
p(xa, yb) ηxaτxaλp+
ηxaτxaλu,xa + λd,xa
]
Da
}−1
and
πb =
{
1 +
∑
yb
[ ∑
xa
p(xa, yb) ηybτybλp+
ηybτYbλu,yb + λd,yb
]
Db
}−1
by noting that, when several devices are used in series,
a good approximation considers the whole apparatus to
be a black box, with a non-extending dead time equal to
the largest of dead times of the single component [36].
We showed in Ref. [38] that πz provides a satisfactory
approximation for t >> Dz.
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